This paper analyses various landmark criminal cases in the Netherlands that saw individual professionals being blamed for allegedly contributing to safety-critical events occurring in the past twenty years. These cases can be seen as symbolizing an increasingly risk-averse society whose expectations of human capacity for securing safety have reached unprecedented levels. In this view, punishing professionals who make dangerous mistakes serves to re-establish the illusion of being in control and to satisfy emotions. In practice, however, the prosecution of professional error appears to be somewhat out of touch with public sentiment, as responses to the cases discussed revealed little public support and a backlash among professionals. Moreover, safety science and practice claim that punishing individual error tends to undermine safety and overemphasizes the role of individual error compared to systemic failures. This begs the question of whether criminal liability should be imposed at the system level, as recently happened when local governments were sentenced following fatalities on dangerous road spots. Sentencing ‘system administrators’ may have advantages, but probably produces negative effects as well. Therefore, it would be ideal if administrators reduced the need for resorting to criminal law by proactively and generously taking responsibility for their organisation’s share in accidents.

This article analyses a cause for the abundance of disproportional risk policies in the Netherlands. Many policymakers and academics believe that people in the Netherlands today are so risk averse that they are not willing to accept any risk that may result from reasonable risk policies. However, as some examples that we present show, there appears to be another kind of Dutch citizen: a citizen that understands and supports the decision of authorities that increase the risk to citizens but are necessary from the perspective of the common good. We argue that the belief in the unreasonable citizen is informed by one-sided research that only asks citizens how they perceive risks and what they want as risk consumers. Asking the same respondents face-to-face what they would do as policymakers themselves, however, results in diametric answers that show a rational and social side of those respondents. Respondents give higher priority to the education system or traffic safety than to preventing unusual risks such as asbestos or terrorism to themselves. Hence, the justification of reasonable risk policies is not as difficult as generally assumed.

Since the start of the 21^st century, most nations have followed the lead of the World Health Organization and developed specific policies to tackle the ‘global obesity epidemic’. The medical reasoning is that non-contagious diseases are the most important causes of mortality and morbidity, especially in prosperous nations. As these diseases are conceptualized as ‘caused’ by ‘unhealthy lifestyle choices’, there is dire need for preventive lifestyle policies that help people make ‘the healthy choice’. Seen from this perspective the distribution of responsibilities between governments and their citizens is made in accordance to the ‘intervention ladder’, which has been developed from a stewardship model.
Regarding the ‘obesity epidemic’, this contribution tests the basic medical claims behind this science policy complex. We find that the knowledge base for these claims is highly uncertain and that interventions lack efficacy. Furthermore, research points to increased levels of stigmatization of ‘fat people’, leading more discrimination. All this changes the status of the policies from preventive (i.e. proportionate) to precautionary (i.e. disproportionate). Further analysis of the preventive medical and policy paradigms shows both are by default biased towards precaution. Combined with the notion that citizens of democratic societies are entitled to trustworthy and transparent information, this contribution concludes that a reorientation of both paradigms is called for.

Lack of safety leading to death or injury has many aspects: personal violence, traffic, accidents at home or the work place, not to mention other external sources as radiation and fine dust or internal sources like diseases. In this paper we restrict ourselves to the lack of safety in traffic as a system, and address the following questions: (1) Is traffic a system with one dominant responsible actor (Ministry of Traffic)? (2) What explanations are offered for the lack of safety? (3) Who is responsible for safety? (4) What sort of interventions are suitable for enhancing safety? and (5) What type of process/consultancy is most appropriate for answer the preceding questions?
The paper arrives at its conclusions via an indirect way, namely a short analysis of what a system comprises and what constitutes an explanation, responsibility and effectiveness. It appears that we are all causally involved in the lack of safety, and we are all responsible at all levels of society: micro-individual, meso-organizational and macro-societal. Therefore a promising route to maximize safety is a governance perspective comprising multiple stakeholder co-responsibility. It remains to be seen whether this perspective should replace the predominant command and control governance or complement it.

Incidents in organizations are inevitable. Sometimes these incidents get out of hand and reach the newspapers. But there are also incidents that are addressed in a timely and effective manner and do not escalate to become serious failures. Based on six concrete ‘near misses’ within the education sector, we have investigated how appropriate actions can prevent serious omissions and which mechanisms play a role in this.