Algorithms are starting to play an increasingly prominent role in government organizations. The argument is that algorithms can make more objective and efficient decisions than humans. At the same time, recent scandals have highlighted that there are still many problems connected to algorithms in the public sector. There is an increasing emphasis on ethical requirements for algorithms and we aim to connect these requirements to insights from public administration on the use of technologies in the public sector. We stress the need for responsible algorithmization – responsible organizational practices around the use of algorithms – and argue that this is needed to maintain the trust of citizens. We present two key components of responsible algorithmization – value-sensitivity and transparency – and show how these components connect to algorithmization and can contribute to citizen trust. We end the article with an agenda for research into the relation between responsible algorithmization and trust.

This article contains a critical reflection on eXplainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI): the idea that AI based decision-making using AI should be transparent to people faced with these decisions. We discuss the main objections to XAI. XAI focuses on a variety of explainees, with different expectations and values; XAI is not a neutral activity, but very value-sensitive; AI is dynamic and so XAI quickly becomes obsolete; many problems are ‘wicked’, which further complicates XAI. In addition, the context of XAI matters – a high level of politicization and a high perceived impact of AI-based decisions, will often result in much criticism of AI and will limit the opportunities of XAI. We also discuss a number of alternative or additional strategies – more attention to negotiated algorithms; to competing algorithms; or to value-sensitive algorithms, which may contribute to more trust in AI-based decision-making.

The police use all sorts of information to fulfil their tasks. Whereas collection and interpretation of information traditionally could only be done by humans, the emergence of ‘Big Data’ creates new opportunities and dilemmas. On the one hand, large amounts of data can be used to train algorithms. This allows them to ‘predict’ offenses such as bicycle theft, burglary, or even serious crimes such as murder and terrorist attacks. On the other hand, highly relevant questions on purpose, effectiveness, and legitimacy of the application of machine learning/‘artificial intelligence’ drown all too often in the ocean of Big Data. This is particularly problematic if such systems are used in the public sector in democracies, where the rule of law applies, and where accountability, as well as the possibility for judicial review, are guaranteed. In this article, we explore the role transparency could play in reconciling these opportunities and dilemmas. While some propose making the systems and data they use themselves transparent, we submit that an open and broad discussion on purpose and objectives should be held during the design process. This might be a more effective way of embedding ethical and legal principles in the technology, and of ensuring legitimacy during application.

Algorithms applied in public administration are often criticized for lack of transparency. Lawmakers and citizens alike expect that automated decisions based on algorithmic recommendations to be explainable. The focus of this article is the organizational context behind the idea of transparent algorithms. Transparency is portrayed as one of numerous values that are at play when algorithms are applied in public administration. The article shows that applying algorithms may lead to conflicts between these values. Such conflicts often result in trade-off decisions. Looking from the organizational perspective, we describe how such trade-offs can be made both explicitly and implicitly. The article thus shows the complexity of algorithmic trade-offs. As a result of this complexity, we not only call for more transparency about algorithms, but also more transparency about trade-offs that take place in public administration. Finally, we present a research agenda focused on studying the organization of trade-offs.

‘Nudging’ has been introduced as a policy and management tool as a way to influence behaviour without limiting choice. Nudging is mainly used to influence citizens’ behaviour but can also be used to influence the behavior of healthcare professionals. Examples include posters used to improve hand-hygiene compliance, or ‘default’ options in systems to reduce excessive prescriptions of specific medication. However, using nudges raises major worries and ethical issues, also in relation to the independence of healthcare professionals. While the scientific discussion about the desirability of nudges is extensive, the voices of healthcare professionals, who are the subjects of nudges, remain unheard. In this qualitative research we explore the perceptions of nudging held by various healthcare professionals. The interviews reveal that healthcare professionals are generally unfamiliar with the concept of nudging, but they do recognize nudges in their own field of practice. Furthermore, while they are predominantly positive about nudging, they also express concerns about the pressure on their autonomy. These concerns are related to changing professionalism and regulatory pressures in healthcare.

Over the past three years a number of reports and initiatives have emerged which seem to point to a different approach to solve problems in and with executive agencies. In the past, most problems were blamed on the agencies, by the media and politicians alike. However, these new reports and initiatives seem to allow room for a different, more realistic explanation. This article lists five of these reports and initiatives. First a letter on the results of the new coalition formation in 2017, concluding that executive agencies are under too much pressure and blame, and drawing more attention to the role of the legislature and the executive powers. Second, a report has been written by the Senior Civil Service – commissioned by a group of ministries – that offers a powerful analysis of the various causes of problems in and with executive agencies, leading to a number of prescriptions for all parties involved. Third, a ministerial committee has been established to discuss these problems and possible solutions on a regular basis. Fourth, the House of Representatives has launched a parliamentary inquiry into this topic. And finally, an unsolicited advisory report by the Council of State has been published on the dilemmas around ministerial accountability, stating that the blame for problems in and with executive agencies is often attributed in a false way. Together these five reports and initiatives call for a broader approach in handling such problems and hence more effective solutions.